1. God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that it is neither forced, nor, by any absolute necessity of nature, determined to good, or evil (Matt. 17:12; James 1:14; Deut. 30:19).
By virtue of creation, mankind was given a true and natural liberty with regard to all issues of good and evil. Adam, when he fell, was not coerced or dragged into that sin. The decree which God had given concerning the fall of man did not “force” Adam to his sin, and neither had God implanted within Adam any program of internal coercion. Now how can a non-coercive decree be a sovereign decree? The answer to the question resides in the fact that the “causal agent” in the sovereign decrees does not inhabit the same “universe” as the thing caused. If it did, then the causation on the one hand displaces responsibility on the other. In other words, God is to the universe what Shakespeare is to Macbeth, and not what Lady Macbeth is to Macbeth. Put another way, God’s relation to the universe is unlike every causal situation in the world that we know. The fact that God determined how everything would go does not mean that He forced it the way we would have to force it to make something like this happen. But note that the Reformed position on the human will is that in the creation God gave it “natural liberty.”
2. Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom, and power to will and to do that which was good and well pleasing to God (Eccl. 7:29; Gen. 1:26); but yet, mutably, so that he might fall from it (Gen. 2:16–17; 3:6).
Adam did not sin by any necessity related to how he had been created. He had the ability to do right. But this ability was no guarantee that he would do right—he was created with the capacity for sin.
3. Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation (Rom. 5:6; 8:7; John 15:5): so as, a natural man, being altogether averse from that good (Rom. 3:10, 12), and dead in sin (Eph. 2:1, 5. Col. 2:13), is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto (John 6:44, 65; Eph. 2:2–5; 1 Cor. 2:14; Tit. 3:13, 4–5).
We must begin our discussion of this important subject by distinguishing between physical liberty and moral liberty. Physical liberty means the ability to turn right or left, to raise one’s hand or lower it, to choose chocolate or vanilla. Moral liberty means the ability to choose the right course of action, and to do so for the right reasons. Men as creatures have a physical liberty, but as sinners they have lost all moral liberty in Adam. The relation between physical liberty and the sovereignty of God presents an interesting philosophical problem, which should be addressed in accordance with the discussion above concerning paragraph one.
But the loss of moral liberty presents no problem whatever. The question there is not how to reconcile God’s sovereignty in salvation with our liberty, because we do not have any such liberty. There is nothing there to reconcile; we do not assert liberty, and therefore do not have to explain how it can coexist with what God does. We are no more able to choose good than a pig can choose to fly.
We consequently have no moral power, and this means we cannot convert ourselves, and we cannot prepare ourselves to be converted by God. In this regard, we do absolutely nothing. Man as creature is free—we have as much natural liberty to go right or left as Adam did. The Fall did not rob us of our creaturely liberty. The Fall did ensure the loss of our ability to choose what is right for the right reasons. Man as creature is free; man as sinner is not.
4. When God converts a sinner, and translates him into the state of grace, He freeth him from his natural bondage under sin (Col. 1:13; John 8:34, 36); and, by His grace alone, enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good (Phil. 2:13; Rom 6:18, 22); yet so, as that by reason of his remaining corruption, he doth not perfectly, nor only, will that which is good, but doth also will that which is evil (Gal. 5:17; Rom. 7:15, 18–19, 21, 23).
After conversion, moral liberty is restored, but not completely and immutably restored. In other words, we are still capable of sin, and further, we are not capable of complete and final perfection. But the good we do is truly and genuinely good. Because it is not perfect, it cannot be considered as the ground of our justification before God, but it is nonetheless genuine.
5. The will of man is made perfectly and immutably free to do good alone in the state of glory only (Eph. 4:13; Heb. 12:23; 1 John 3:2; Jude 24).
True freedom is found in heaven, where we choose what is right, and can do no other. Freedom is therefore not defined as the “power of contrary choice,” but rather as the freedom to do nothing but right. By the former definition, God Himself is not free, and therefore is not a moral agent. If the “power of contrary choice” is essential to the identity of being a moral being, then God is not a moral being, and we will not be moral in heaven. This definition would make heaven nothing but an eternal moral prison. But the latter definition shows us where true freedom resides.
By way of summary, this is a good place to introduce Augustine’s famous four-fold distinction.
1. libertas Adami: posse non peccare—able not to sin, which was the condition of Adam before the fall
2. libertas peccatorum: non posse non peccare—not able not to sin, which is the condition of fallen men
3. libertas fidelium: posse peccare et non peccare—able to sin and not sin
4. libertas gloriae: non posse peccare—not able to sin, which is our condition in glory